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INTRODUCTION
BALAZS UJVARI
The European Union (EU) and China are both central actors in international affairs,
collectively accounting for almost 40% (in current market prices) of the world’s gross
domestic product (GDP).1 While addressing the key global challenges of the 21st
century increasingly requires an entente between these two actors, their relation-
ship is often plagued by conflicting interests. Whether or not the EU will grant market
economy status to China still looms largely in the trade relations of the two; the EU
is still yet to lift its arms embargo on China; and they also differ in climate action
responsibilities, to name a few.
In addition to conflicting interests, the EU-China relationship is also hampered by the
existence of ‘conceptual gaps’: the two entities tend to attach different interpreta-
tions to the same notions and concepts. These conceptual gaps manifest themselves
in all walks of life. They are even visible in everyday social interactions between
European and Chinese officials, scholars and businessmen. When Chinese interna-
tional relations scholars arrive in Europe to exchange views with their counterparts
in European think tanks, for example, the difference in mindsets often surfaces
instantly: while the receiving Europeans tend to follow a pre-arranged schedule and
speak with multiple voices, their Chinese interlocutors often seem to be oblivious of
formerly agreed time constraints and speak almost exclusively through the most
senior member of the delegation, relegating other delegates to an observatory role.
In addition to such everyday occurrences, conceptual gaps between Europeans and
Chinese also exist with regard to some key concepts in international relations: sover-
eignty; human rights; democracy; strategic partnership as well as global governance
and multilateralism. These conceptual gaps also explain why China and the EU often
position themselves differently at the international stage when addressing issues of
global concern.
The existence of conceptual gaps in Sino-European relations is, of course, not a novel
area of research, and has generated a considerable amount of literature in the recent
past.2 In addition to describing the conceptual differences, several contributions
have also been written to reflect on ways to overcome these gaps. While these have
1 ec.europa.eu, The EU in the world – 2016 edition, 2016, p. 79, last accessed on 23 March 2017.
2 S. Keukeleire and Ching Lin Pang, ‘Conceptual Gaps in China-EU relations: Global Governance, Human Rights
and Strategic Partnerships – Review‘, Global Affairs, 1(1), 2015, pp. 105-107; S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux,
The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 2014, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 317-320.2
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEtended to focus on the issue of sovereignty,3 rule of law4 or strategic partnerships;5
the diverging approaches of China and the EU to global governance and multilater-
alism has received less attention – a void this paper intends to fill.
The EU’s preferred interpretation of multilateralism has long, but especially since the
European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, amounted to a support for a set of univer-
sally applicable legally binding commitments, with little appetite for tailor-made
arrangements to accommodate the distinct preferences of various country group-
ings. In addition to favouring majority decisions, the Union often proves eager to chip
away at the sovereignty of contracting parties, while also formulating a strong link
between economic policies and human rights considerations as well as environ-
mental and social standards.6 Arguably, this approach is reflective of the EU’s modus
operandi when it comes to internal decision-making and can be seen as a projection
of the 28-country bloc’s own way of functioning onto the international scene. In
recognition of the EU’s declining relative weight in international affairs combined
with persisting Eurosceptic tendencies internally, the recently-endorsed EU Global
Strategy (EUGS) has somewhat softened the above stance. The document appears to
be fond of decision-making in a bottom-up manner as an alternative to proceeding
through international bodies in a top-down fashion. In other words, the EUGS
appears to give more room to bi- or plurilateral arrangements as building blocks
towards broader multilateral frameworks, as with the approval by the United
Nations Security Council of the outcome of the E3/EU+3 negotiations with Iran.7
In contrast to the EU, China appears to favour consensus-based decision-making
that, in turn, results in voluntary clauses and a strong emphasis on national sover-
eignty. It also invariably considers its development through economic growth to be a
priority, showing reluctance to subscribe to stringent environmental and social
standards given their possibly adverse impact on the country’s economic perfor-
mance.8
This Egmont paper aims to identify ways of overcoming the deadlock that often
characterises EU-China co-operation in multilateral institutions and processes due to
their differing interpretations of global governance. Addressing this conceptual gap
has become an increasingly pressing issue of late given new US president Donald
Trump’s rather isolationist position and critical stance towards multilateral bodies.
Cooperation between the EU and China becomes therefore ever more crucial now as
3 P. Zhongqi, ‘Managing the conceptual gap on sovereignty in China-EU relations,’ Asia Europe Journal 8(2),
2010, pp. 227-243.
4 M. Burnay; J. Hivonnet and K. Raube, ‘Bridging the EU-China’s gap on the Rule of Law?’, Asia Europe
Journal, 14(1), 2016, pp. 95-106.
5 M.U. Stumbaum, How to make the Strategic Partnership Work: EU Co-operation with China in Security
Affairs, Clingendael essay, 12 July 2012.
6 S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux, Ibid, pp. 317-320.
7 B. Ujvari, The EU Global Strategy: from effective multilateralism to global governance that works, Security
Policy Brief, no. 76, Egmont Institute.
8 S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux, Ibid, pp. 317-320.3
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEthey are the two actors most apt to fill the vacuum a backtracking US would create
on the international scene and provide new leadership on global governance. The
paper draws on the perspectives of four Chinese experts of EU-China relations, each
of which focuses on a particular policy domain when reflecting on how to render the
co-operation of the two sides more effective in multilateral fora.
Balazs Ujvari is a Joint Research Fellow at the Egmont – Royal Institute for Interna-
tional Relations and the European Policy Centre.4
THE EU AND CHINA: MISMATCHED PARTNERS 
ON DEVELOPMENT
HAI YANG
For several decades, developed countries have been the leading players in interna-
tional development, offering annually billions-worth assistance to developing
countries with the stated moral objective of assisting in their social and economic
development. However, the growing importance of ‘new kids on the block’, most
notably China with its substantial financial weight and expanding global engagement,
has brought to the fore the divergent perspectives and approaches between
emerging and traditional donors. More recently, the Chinese government under the
leadership of Xi Jinping has undertaken a series of high-profile actions focusing on
developing physical infrastructure and improving regional connectivity, such as the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Silk Road Fund (SRF), Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB), and New Development Bank (NDB)1. Taken together, these noteworthy
China-backed multilateral initiatives, coming at a time of global power shifts and
economic doldrums, have given rise to renewed speculations about the intensifying
competition between the ‘donor cartel’ and non-traditional donors, as well as their
profound implications for the landscape of development finance and the rising
powers’ ulterior motive to reshape/upend the existing global order.
The European Union (EU) prides itself on being the world’s largest donor of official
development assistance (ODA). The EU and 19 Member States sit on the official
coordinating body – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and constitute a dominant force
in setting the rules of the game for development. Even China used to be a beneficiary
of the EU’s bilateral development assistance, from which it graduated in January
2015. But facing the continual rise of emerging donors, particularly China with its
distinct approach and ambitious initiatives, the extant architecture of development
cooperation spearheaded by Europe and the United States is being contested. In
response to such fast-changing realities, it would be useful for EU policymakers to
have a more nuanced understanding of Chinese views and approaches with regard
to development cooperation and how China’s development agenda differs from that
of the EU. In so doing, Europe can better assess the future impact of China-led struc-
tures epitomised by the BRI, SRF, AIIB and NDB on the global development landscape
and on the prevailing norms and practices related to development cooperation. After
1 The NDB is a multilateral development bank established jointly by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa).5
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEknowing what might be at stake and what are the prospective benefits, European
policymakers can potentially transform these China-led multilateral initiatives into a
unique opportunity to establish more cooperation with China and maximise
European strategic and economic interests, as already exemplified by the EU-China
Connectivity Platform aiming to explore synergy between Europe’s €315 billion
investment plan and China’s grandiose BRI.
Different views, different models
China’s approach in respect of development cooperation has been influenced by its
domestic context and experience. Over the past several decades, the overriding
priority for the ruling communist party has been to deliver economic growth and
alleviate extreme poverty. It is believed that once economic liberalisation and devel-
opment reach a particular phase, political reform, insofar as democratisation, good
governance, transparency, accountability, and improvement of human rights are
concerned, will follow in due course.2 Also, owing in part to the ‘Century of Humilia-
tion’, China in general adopts a sovereignty-bound approach and stresses the
principle of non-interference. But it incrementally takes a flexible approach because
Beijing aspires to be (perceived as) a ‘responsible stakeholder’ befitting its role as a
major power, which in turn requires the rising power to step up efforts in facilitating
development and maintaining peace. Moreover, Beijing is confronted with the
daunting task of protecting overseas Chinese nationals and investments, menaced by
state failure, regional instability and terrorism. China’s expanding security footprint
in Africa (e.g. deploying combat forces in South Sudan and Mali in UN peacekeeping
framework and building a naval base in Djibouti) and the Middle East (e.g. playing a
mediating role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Syrian civil war, and Sunni-Shia
divide) is a case in point. For the EU, development entails as preconditions
democratic institutions, strong governance, and human rights. Democratic reform
and structural adjustment are deemed integral to inclusive and sustainable develop-
ment. With such different views on development, it should come as no surprise that
China and the EU adopt rather diverging approaches to development cooperation.
Anchored in the camp of developing countries, China embeds foreign aid within the
framework of South-South cooperation and views it as a vital instrument of
economic diplomacy in its ever-expanding dealings with developing nations, notably
in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America. Chinese official narrative dictates that
development cooperation shall be grounded on the doctrines of non-interference,
equality and mutual benefit. In the latest White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid
released in July 2014, it stipulates unequivocally that “When providing foreign assis-
tance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions, not
2 Y. Huang, ‘China’s Conflict between Economic and Political Liberalization.’ SAIS Review of International
Affairs, 32(2) 2012, pp. 51-63.6
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEinterfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully respecting their
right to independently choosing their own paths and models of development. The
basic principles China upholds in providing foreign assistance are mutual respect,
equality, keeping promise, mutual benefits and win-win.”3 Equally significant to note
is that as an outlier of the extant DAC-dominated aid system, China does not follow
the OECD’s definition or practice of development assistance.4 According to the 2014
White Paper, Chinese foreign aid consists of three types: grants, interest-free loans
and concessional loans. In a strict sense, trade, investment and commercial loans,
which make up a sizeable portion of China’s growing presence in countries with rich
natural resources and huge market potential, fall outside the aid category. Another
important feature of Chinese aid is its preoccupation with physical infrastructure
construction, not least in Africa and Asia. Among China’s cumulative foreign aid from
2010 to 2012, 44.8 percent went to economic infrastructure projects (e.g. transport,
communications, electricity, energy), as opposed to 27.6 percent for social public
facilities (e.g. hospitals, schools, water supply).5 An explanation may be that tradi-
tional donors tend to shun long-term large-scale infrastructure projects owing to
their hefty investment requirement, low returns and long payback terms, and China
as a latecomer was quick to fill the relatively easy niche. As for geographic focus,
from 2010 to 2012, 51.8 percent of aid was directed to Africa, followed by 30.5
percent for Asia.
By contrast, setting governance and macroeconomic conditionality has been an
enduring commitment of EU development cooperation, at least on paper. Dubbed
‘Normative Power Europe’, the Union has long been linking its ODA and preferential
trade arrangements to the political will and resolve of partner countries to respect
democratic values and undertake painful reforms. The human rights clause (human
rights, rule of law, democratic principles) was first incorporated as a fundamental
element in Lomé IV Agreement (1990-2000), which served as an overall framework
for governing the trade and aid relations between the EU and the African, Caribbean,
Pacific countries. Subsequently, the clause was expanded to include good govern-
ance in the Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020). Regardless of the coherence and effec-
tiveness of applying incentive-based conditionality in practice, EU institutions and
politicians have emphasised over and again the instrumental use of development
partnerships to promulgate in developing countries democratic values, including,
inter alia, “respect for human rights, democracy, fundamental freedoms and the rule
of law, good governance, gender equality, solidarity and social justice.”6 Apart from
3 White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid 2014, Information Office of the State Council, P.R. China, Beijing, July
2014.
4 Two defining features of ODA: is administered with the promotion of the economic development and
welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a
grant element of at least 25 per cent.
5 White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid 2014 (Chinese version).
6 ec.europa.eu, European Consensus on Development, 2006.7
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEthe notable difference on conditionality, a close look at the sectoral and project
priorities reveals that Brussels does not have such a prominent emphasis on physical
infrastructure as Beijing. In 2014, only 11 percent of EuropeAid (European Commis-
sion Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation) disbursements went to
sectors related to economic infrastructure (transport, communications, energy),
whereas sectors related to social infrastructure (civil society and government, educa-
tion, health, water supply) accounted for a whopping 36 percent.7 Such a sectoral
breakdown can be also seen from 2004 to 2013.8 As regards regional distribution, the
lion’s share of EU aid goes to Africa and its eastern neighbours.
Different agendas, fruitless cooperation
For the time being, both the European and Chinese approaches to development
cooperation are equally problematic and suffer from systematic problems. On the
European side, conditionality has rarely been implemented in a consistent fashion
and EU aid operations have often been criticised for incoherence and double stand-
ards. The EU’s laudable efforts to leverage development assistance for democracy
and human rights promotion and specifically as a catalyst for political change, or
more explicitly elections, have met strong resistance in certain target countries. This
is partially because prioritising democracy downplays the fact that for poverty-
stricken populations the quintessence of development is economic growth and
improvement of infrastructures and livelihoods. Also, the elite and grassroots of
these countries have become increasingly disillusioned and reluctant to give the EU
carte blanche to interfere at their expenses, given that they have less costly alterna-
tives. On the Chinese side, a great number of countries to which China provides ‘no-
strings attached’ aid and development finance are authoritarian, corrupt and
unstable regimes, resulting naturally in a higher risk of defaulting. Without the
guarantee of good governance safeguarded by solid institutions and respectable
officials, it is difficult to envisage that the destitute can benefit much from the aid
offered. In addition, Chinese aid projects, under the purview of the Ministry of
Commerce and usually implemented by profit-seeking enterprises, are associated
with commercial gains and skewed towards extractive industries, often causing
environmental and reputational problems. Admittedly, Beijing does give aid to
countries with little resources, but aid packages in these cases are contingent on
political support for issues vital to China in multilateral fora (e.g. One-China Principle,
South China Sea). Furthermore, Chinese aid is often tied with service contracts for
Chinese companies. As such it remains debatable whether Sino-centric development
cooperation is genuinely mutually beneficial and conducive to the sustainable devel-
opment of local societies. Due to these problematic practices often associated with
7 ec.europa.eu, EU Annual Report on Development and External Assistance, 2015.
8 ec.europa.eu, EU Annual Report on Development and External Assistance, 2014 and 2013.8
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEmercantilist neocolonialist behaviour, China has come under mounting pressure
from both Western donors and local communities.
Diverging approaches and competing interests have not only led to mistrust, mutual
bashing and lack of consensus, but have also curtailed the scope and discounted the
efficiency of development cooperation between the two otherwise complementary
actors, both in bilateral and multilateral settings. Bilaterally, institutionalised EU-
China dialogues on Africa, Asia and Latin America have yet to translate into an effec-
tive mechanism for achieving substantive common ground on strategic issues
including development and security. In 2008, the European Commission proposed an
EU-China-Africa trilateral dialogue on African development but so far it has failed to
materialise, caused in part by discordant approach and interest between the EU and
China. In multilateral fora, Beijing has been participating in the China-DAC Study
Group, launched in 2009 aiming to promote mutual learning between China and DAC
members with the aim of improving aid effectiveness; China has also been a member
of the G20 Development Working Group, established in 2010 in a bid to foster a
collective accord on development. But in both occasions EU-China coordination has
been piecemeal, if not dismal. While the EU attempts to ‘socialise’ China and
promote universal regimes with binding rules, Beijing’s main objectives to partake in
such intergovernmental fora are to legitimate its own approach, boost credentials of
emerging donors and steer discussions on the post-2015 development agenda in a
non-binding setting.9
The way forward
The participation of 14 EU Member States as a founding member in the AIIB,10 the
EU-China Connectivity Platform, the accession of China to the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the co-financing arrangements between
the AIIB and the EBRD and the European Investment Bank, have opened up new
prospects for joint action. In particular, co-financing infrastructure projects might
allow an awaited combination of safeguards with efficiency. Nevertheless, to turn a
rising China into a real strategic partner on development, Europe needs to capitalise
on the recent Beijing-led multilateral initiatives and take a step forward in its engage-
ment with China.
9 C. Castillejo, ‘Engaging China on Development’, Policy Brief no. 151, FRIDE, March 2013. For more details on
the respective position of China and the EU on the post-2015 agenda, see: Council Conclusions on a New
Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015, and China’s Position
Paper on the Post-2015 Development Agenda.
10 More EU countries including Belgium and Hungary are getting ready to join the Bank, see: Balazs Ujvari,
Egmont Papers 85, online at http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ep85.pdf. The
application of these two countries was formally approved by the board of governors of the AIIB on 23
March 2017.9
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCETo that end, European policymakers would be well-served to take specific actions.
First, EU development actors, at European and national levels alike, could agree on
certain common lines and act in unison in an effort to narrow the gaps between high-
flying rhetoric and sobering reality concerning both their dealings with China and the
application of conditionality. European development projects ought to be guided
more by the real needs of partner countries than by the domestic considerations of
donors. Second, rather than attempting to socialise China, Europe needs to demon-
strate understanding by recognising the diversity of development paradigms and aid
models, and giving credence to the utility of the Chinese approach, with a view to
finding better practices. Third, EU may need to leverage further institutionalised
bilateral dialogues, partnerships, and multilateral fora not only to boost cooperation
on bilateral policy priorities (e.g. low-carbon development, urbanisation), but also to
better coordinate positions and policies on regional and global development-related
challenges (e.g. infrastructure financing gaps, state failures, regional conflicts).
It takes two to tango, however. To bridge the salient differences, Chinese policy-
makers likewise need to make substantive adjustments. First, to measure up to the
prevailing norms and standards, China needs to continue to optimise its bureaucratic
structures of foreign aid and improve the overall quality of delivery by channeling aid
through more diversified credible conduits and better coordinating the efforts of a
growing array of actors involved. Second, the authorities concerned could oversee
that profit-seeking enterprises respect necessary environmental and social stand-
ards and integrate more local actors in implementing projects to offset the negative
perceptions of ‘tied aid’. Third, Beijing ought to encourage and facilitate Europe’s
participation in the already-available China-led multilateral platforms while simulta-
neously seeking more win-win cooperation with European actors on the ground and
in extant multilateral fora.
Hai Yang is a PhD researcher at the Catholic University of Leuven.10
FREE TRADE TALKS: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CHINA 
AND THE EU
HUANG JING
Free trade has played a key role in underpinning globalisation in the past decades.
Both the European Union (EU) and China, the two largest trading entities in the
world, have developed vested interests in furthering international trade liberaliza-
tion efforts.1 In view of the deadlocked Doha Development Round (DDR), China has
joined the global trend of negotiating free trade agreements in bi- and plurilateral
fashion. Despite Beijing’s involvement with free trade agreements (FTA), the country
retains an interest in the further liberalization of trade in non-agricultural products
through the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The EU, along with its continued
support for the WTO track, is also engaged in a number of FTA negotiations, not least
with Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines. The fact remains, however, that the Union
finds its primary interests in the liberalization of trade in services – an area that
largely escapes the DDR’s agenda. In light of these structural differences in the stance
of Beijing and Brussels – which currently also pursue negotiations on a bilateral
investment treaty with a view to potentially concluding a comprehensive FTA in the
mid-term – on global trade relations, the prospects of improved co-operation are
worth a scrutiny.
Sticking points
(1) Economic growth versus legal standards
In order to avoid trade diversion resulting from burgeoning FTAs, China in 2007,
moved to adopt a free trade area strategy and set out to enhance bilateral and multi-
lateral economic cooperation.2 Thus far, the country has signed 14 FTAs, of which 12
have entered into force. Through these accords, China mainly aims to further elimi-
nate tariff and non-tariff barriers on non-agricultural goods, improve market access
and create more business opportunities notably for its state-owned enterprises. In
contrast to the United States’ and the EU’s hitherto prevailing strategy of pursuing
mega-regional trade deals (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, EU-
Mercosur trade talks or the Trans-Pacific Partnership), China has privileged bilateral
agreements, some of which have had a notable economic impact. For instance,
1 ec.europa.eu, Countries and regions: China, last accessed on 23 March 2017.
2 Xinhua, President Hu Jintao’s Report at the 17th Party Congress, 24 October 2017.11
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trade has increased at an annual rate ranging from 20 to 65 percent. In the wake of
the China–New Zealand FTA, China replaced the United States as New Zealand’s
second-largest trading partner. Finally, in the six months following January 2010,
when the FTA between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) came into full effect, their bilateral trade increased by 49.6%.3
Just like Europeans may find it difficult to understand China’s continued urge for
unhindered economic growth, the Chinese also often fail to grasp the domestic
reasons that push EU negotiators to champion governance, environmental or labour
standards in FTAs. For the EU, a FTA is an international treaty that entails profound
legal ramifications. Considerable changes to domestic regulations, challenges from
the European Court of Justice and a possible veto by the European Parliament are all
issues of serious concern during the negotiations. While China has also had to imple-
ment changes in domestic legislation in line with its WTO commitment,4 doing so for
Beijing is less cumbersome given the specificities of the Chinese political system.5
Besides, it is very rare for an international treaty signed by the Chinese government
to be challenged by a domestic legislative institution, which explains the lesser
emphasis on legality in China-negotiated FTAs. Instead of compulsory dispute settle-
ment mechanisms, for example, China prefers non-litigious and conflict-avoiding
means of dispute settlement.
(2) Step-by-step versus catch-it-all
The second point of divergence in the EU’s and China’s approaches to trade negotia-
tions concerns the scope of the agreements they seek to conclude. In this regard,
China has a clear preference for a step-by-step approach. A quintessential example
is the China-Pakistan FTA that has evolved through four stages: the conclusion of a
Preferential Trade Agreement in 2003, the launch of the Early Harvest Programme in
April 2005, the inking of the China-Pakistan FTA itself in November 2006, finally
complemented by the Agreement on Trade in Services in February 2009 to facilitate
investment co-operation. China’s FTA with the ASEAN provides another example of
the very same approach. Between the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation in 2002 and the creation of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
(ACFTA) in 2010, China and the ASEAN had signed seven agreements, including trade
in goods and services, trade dispute settlement and investment. Even after ACFTA
3 G. Wang, ‘China’s FTAs: Legal Characteristics and Implications’, The American Journal of International Law,
105(3), July 2011, p. 505.
4 K. Zeng and W. Liang (eds.), China and Global Trade Governance: China’s First Decade in the World Trade
Organization, Routledge, 2013.
5 In order to join the WTO, China had fundamentally rebuilt its legal regime on external economic relations,
which had been accomplished without painful bargaining or making much fanfare in the public discourse.
See: T. Y. Man, ‘National Legal Restructuring in Accordance with International Norms: GATT/WTO and
China’s Foreign Trade Reform’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 4(2), Spring, 1997, pp. 471-507.12
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and amendment of the free trade area. In 2013, China and ASEAN signed, for
example, a protocol to incorporate technical barriers to trade and sanitary and
phytosanitary measures into the Agreement on Trade in Goods.
By sharp contrast, the EU usually aims to ‘have it all’ when negotiating trade deals.
Having, in essence, developed a ‘template’ for FTAs, the Union appears to have a
concrete vision as to what an overarching and high-standard trade agreement should
look like. To strike a deal on a comprehensive set of issues, FTAs involving the EU take
several years to negotiate. Talks on the EU-Canada trade agreement (CETA), which
began in 2009 and ended in 2014, covered, for instance, government procurement,
investment protection, intellectual property rights, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, geographical indications, sustainable development, regulatory coopera-
tion, mutual recognition, trade facilitation, cooperation on raw materials, dispute
settlement and technical barriers to trade, to name a few.
The Chinese elites are aware that the next-generation of FTAs will set a new bench-
mark for commerce and have already demonstrated a willingness to approach trade
negotiations in a similar fashion. Yet, in the short term, Beijing is likely to continue its
step-by-step approach, including through the Japan-China-Republic of Korea Free
Trade Agreement as well as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
(3) Particularity versus universality
Both the EU and China boast of a large number of trade partners. Their approach to
(de)regulating trade with their partners, however, differs significantly. While the EU
has tended to adopt a largely inflexible and unified approach towards all of its
commercial partners, China has showcased more flexibility in accommodating their
needs. Although the EU does differentiate between candidate countries, its neigh-
bours without enlargement prospects or the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of
states when negotiating FTAs, within these country groupings ‘one size fits all’
considerations tend to apply. In addition, the EU aims to use “trade agreements and
preference programmes as levers to promote, around the world, European values
like sustainable development, human rights, fair and ethical trade and the fight
against corruption”, as was set out by EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström in
the foreword of the EU’s recently published trade strategy.6
If one deems the EU’s approach a ‘universal’ one, China’s approach, by contrast, is
rather ‘particularistic’. China-negotiated FTAs have exuded more diversity in terms
both the form they take and the economic sectors they cover. In other words, trade
deals negotiated by Beijing have tended to be more cognizant of partners’ particular
6 ec.europa.eu, ‘Trade for all: Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy’, October 2015.13
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEneeds and specific circumstances. This was well exemplified by China’s approval of
the Philippines’s unilateral request for its agricultural sector to be excluded from the
Early Harvest Programme in the context of the China-ASEAN FTA.7
(4) Broad versus narrow scope
China is a latecomer, but a quick learner. While China’s initial FTAs merely dealt with
trade in goods, the more recent agreements have been expanded to cover also trade
in services and investment. In late 2013, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also
decided to grant more attention to environmental considerations, investment
protection, government procurement and e-commerce when negotiating FTAs so as
to form part of the network of high-standard free trade zones evolving globally.8 The
China-Australia FTA is largely representative of this approach. The agreement, which
entered into force on 20 December 2015, covers intellectual property rights,
investor-state dispute settlement, electronic commerce, financial services, transpar-
ency as well as environmental and public health considerations.9 As China continues
to move up the global value-chains, producing increasingly sophisticated yet compet-
itively priced merchandise, developed countries such as EU member states will
increasingly shift the emphasis away from further liberalization of trade in goods
towards that in services in their dealings with Beijing.
Another area of concern is the gradually increasing Chinese appetite to invest in
crisis-torn Europe, especially in the continent’s industrial sector. As the Economist
noted in late 2013, “unfettered globalisation has been replaced by a more selective
brand” where “policymakers have become choosier about whom they trade with,
how much access they grant foreign investors and banks, and what sort of capital
they admit”.10 Indeed, the CETA and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship (TTIP) have proven that public concerns increase as FTAs go beyond pure
economic issues and cover lifestyle-related matters, such as Genetically Modified
Organisms (GMOs) or the audio-visual industry.
The next chapter
In general, as a keen student, China remains flexible and pragmatic in trade negotia-
tions. By contrast, the EU, as a font-runner, continues to be more principled and
rigorous in this field. In most cases, however, their differing attitudes can be recon-
ciled. In fact, in line with its commitment to multilateralism, the EU has been much
7 G. Wang, Ibid, p. 499.
8 China.org.cn, ‘The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in brief‘, 16
November 2013.
9 Dfat.gov.au, Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the
People’s Republic of China, last accessed on 23 March 2017.
10 The Economist, ‘The world economy: The gated globe’, 12 October 2013.14
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEmore supportive of China’s participation in multilateral trade talks, such as the Trade
in Service Agreement (TISA), than for example the United States.11
Crucially, for the momentum of global trade to be maintained, China and the EU must
work together. As the EU is currently negotiating – or has already concluded –
comprehensive FTAs with most of its ten largest trading partners, the rationale for
doing so with China (the EU’s second trading partner) is considerable. Negotiations
on an EU-China Investment Agreement have been ongoing since November 2013. It
has been recognised by Chinese and European political leaders that this agreement
could serve as a precursor to an ambitious China-EU FTA.12 At a time when the DDR
remains stalled and the world’s largest economy (United States) threatens to instill
protectionist tendencies into the international trade system, the prospect of the
China-EU FTA becomes all the more important. For such a treaty to materialise, three
points will be critical to bear in mind.
First, the EU and China could build on the recognition that a reinvigorated global
economy where factors of production flow freely is in their mutual interest. This is,
however, not to suggest that the two must champion unfettered globalization as
some may have wished in between the end of the Cold War and the onset of the
2008/2009 financial meltdown. What is critical is that the EU and China be united in
sending a clear signal to the world that protectionism is undesired and that the world
economy stands to gain from trade liberalisation. To pave the way for a future China-
EU FTA, specifically, it will be paramount to address the recently-emerged public
discontent in Europe towards free trade. One way to do so would concern a greater
public diplomacy action, including a broader effort to consult NGOs and public insti-
tutions potentially leading to the incorporation of specific clauses to reflect public
concerns.
Second, both Europe and China need reassurance from each other. Europeans intend
to see the continued liberalization of the Chinese economy to ensure a level playing
field and a larger room for maneuver for European investors. China, in turn, wants to
ensure that the EU does not support an international trade system that, through a
significant number of FTAs negotiated in a competitive fashion, aims to isolate or
contain China. Nonetheless, if the CCP means to pave way for China’s entry into high-
standard mega-trade agreements, the country will need to make further progress in
the field of environmental protection, intercultural property rights and market
access. As for the EU, a greater recognition of China’s efforts in terms of economic
11 European Commission, ‘EU backs China joining talks on Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)‘, Brussels, 31
March 2014.
12 The latest EU strategy toward China in 2016 has stated the following: “Comprehensive Agreement on
Investment is the EU’s immediate priority towards the objective of deepening and rebalancing our relation-
ship with China. China’s latest white paper on the EU in 2014 stated that: “Actively advance negotiations of
an investment agreement between China and the EU and strive to achieve an agreement as soon as
possible to facilitate two-way investment. Start as soon as possible joint feasibility study on a China-EU
FTA.”15
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most willing to embrace the change would be helpful. The European media and think
tanks could do their part by telling the story of the large-scale changes occurring in
China’s economic system in the recent past. A successful compromise on the market
economy status debate would also be a crucial step in this direction.
Finally, the prospect of concluding an FTA in the foreseeable future would also be
greatly facilitated if the EU allocated more resources to familiarize Chinese govern-
ment officials and diplomats with the legal dimensions of its trade policy. This could
take the form of short training courses in Brussels, which would also allow Europeans
to gain a better understanding of the issues of main concern for the Chinese side.
Huang Jing is an Assistant Researcher at China Institutes of Contemporary Interna-
tional Relations.16
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION AND THE POLITICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE
BAI HEFEI & WANG HONGYU
Climate change is becoming one of – if not – the most acute global issues whose
effective solution requires an unprecedented level of international co-operation.
Amongst the direct consequences are rising sea levels and inter-state conflicts over
increasingly scarce water resources, which risks generating refugee flows across
borders or internally within countries.1 The EU and China are both key actors in
global climate politics given their present economic weight and pollution record.
Europe as the pioneer of industrial revolution had once accounted for 90% of the
planet’s emission, whereas China now is the only country with an annual emission of
more than 10 billion tons.2 Yet, the approaches of these two actors to how global
warming should be tackled often differ. This contribution explores the key areas of
disagreement between the EU’s and China’s position in the negotiations pursued
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and
identifies possible solutions to overcome these differences.
Differing positions on climate politics
The EU and China represent different interests and have therefore different objec-
tives to strive for in international climate negotiations. Generally, the EU spearheads
such talks and positions itself as a leader on global climate governance and thus often
formulates ambitious positions on abatement targets. The EU’s call for a robust,
universal and binding climate regime is informed by its commitment to good govern-
ance and multilateralism. In other words, in seeking to promulgate stringent multi-
lateral solutions in the face of climate change, the 28-country bloc also intends to
export its internal modus operandi in terms of decision-making, demonstrate its
internal cohesion and ability to speak with one voice on the international scene. As
the largest carbon emitter and the second largest economy in the world, China faces
massive domestic challenges but also pressure from the international community to
mobilise significant efforts. However, to assume a greater share in the global
endeavor to mitigate climate change, China must strike a careful balance between
the process of ongoing domestic economic reform and climate change policies.
1 Climatemigration.org.uk, Climate and Migration Coalition brief Q&A on climate change and refugee crisis,
last accessed on 23 March 2017.
2 Chinairn.com, Carbon emissions, 20 January 2016.17
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Led by differing interests, the EU and China have tended to adopt differing
approaches when climate change is concerned. Three points of divergence merit a
more nuanced discussion.
(1) Disagreements on sharing responsibilities
The two parties tend to disagree on how to share the responsibility to act, largely
attributable to different understandings of the principle of the Common But Differ-
entiated Responsibilities (CBDR). It is worth adding that it is not the principle itself
that is being challenged, given that it has been a guiding principle in international
environmental co-operation since it was first put forward at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992.3 China has been a
staunch supporter of the principle. Beijing has long insisted that developed and
developing countries should be allowed to undertake different commitments when
it comes to measuring and reporting. By contrast, the EU has sought to create further
dividing lines within the group of developing countries in recent years, thus singling
out emerging economies (e.g. China) and pressuring them to assume similar commit-
ments as developed ones.
As disagreements on the interpretation of the CBRD persist, the UNFCCC process has
come to be led by a bottom-up approach, where countries determine independently
their emission reduction targets, hence somewhat softening opposition between
country groupings. However, it is not unreasonable to expect that varying interpre-
tations of the CBRD principle will continue to hamper international climate action in
the future.
(2) Disagreements on emission reduction targets
Another disputed area between the EU and China concerns the nature of emission
reduction targets. The EU has long insisted on universally binding reduction targets,
while China has preferred to call for voluntary arrangements with certain conces-
sions for developing countries.
In the run-up to the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21), the EU had proposed a
binding reduction of 40 percent in greenhouse gases by 2030 which would be
measured against 1990 levels. The 28-country bloc’s joint position represented the
first concrete commitment and was considered to be a benchmark for the rest of the
membership.
3 Un.org, 2012 UN Conference on Environment and Development, last accessed on 23 March 2017.18
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states including the Association of Small Island States and non-governmental organ-
isations such as Greenpeace.4 To ensure large participation and a broader validity,
the 2015 Paris conference relied on Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
(INDC). While this bottom-up approach did indeed pave the way successfully for an
agreement acceptable to all parties, there remains a steep gap between what the
totality of the INDCs would achieve and what would be needed to abide by the 2° C
target.
Furthermore, as far as the regular review and tracking of the contributions is
concerned, China will continue to demand differentiated treatment for developing –
including emerging – countries, contrasting with the EU’s push for a unified
approach. This means that, when the reduction targets are renewed every five years
and the modus operandi of monitoring the INDC’s execution is considered, China’s
position may again be at odds with that of the EU.
(3) Divergent views on green finance
The EU and China also have differing views on climate finance. Since the Group of 77
and China declared that developed countries should provide financial support to
developing countries (as per the conclusion of the Bonn Climate Change Conference
in October 2014) to help enhance their mitigation and adaptation actions, 5 it has
been a consensus that the former group would make available 100 billion USD a year
by 2020. However, China insists that this sum should increase year by year with a
clear timeline and roadmap and that most of the aid should stem from the public
sector. However, the Paris agreement did not fulfill China’s vision, largely due to the
EU’s opposition to providing a concrete promise to increase aid and the bloc’s insist-
ence on the private sector being a key source of finance.
China itself should not, however, be relegated to a mere recipient of aid when it
comes to climate finance. At the 2015 US-China Summit, for example, China
committed to offering approximately 3.1 billion USD aid to developing countries to
help their actions aimed at greenhouse gas emission reduction.6 In spite of the
unconditional commitment, China’s delivery of foreign aid, in general, have long
been criticized for several reasons including the lack of transparency and ignorance
of governance standards.7 Moreover, in comparison to the EU, the biggest challenge
China is facing is that its domestic climate mechanisms remain in an embryonic stage.
Take the building of a carbon market as an example, while the EU already has a
4 eubusiness.com, EU’s 2030 climate plan draws mixed response, last accessed on 22 March 2017.
5 Unfccc.int, Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2014, last accessed on 21 March 2017.
6 Ministry of Commerce of P.R.C website, 美联社称习近平的国际援助承诺增强中国外交力量, last accessed
on 22 March 2017.
7 L. Xue, ‘China’s Foreign Aid Policy and Architecture’, Ids Bulletin, 45(4), 2014, pp. 36-45.19
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEmature market, China is still at the experimental stage with an emission trading
system pilot initiated in 2015.8 At the same time, avoiding double accounting and
unleashing the role of public institutions including the Green Climate Fund and the
Global Environment Facility are also potential areas of concern that may divide the
two parties.
What is next?
Despite the above-mentioned differences, synergies in the EU’s and China’s handling
of climate change could arise in line with the Beijing’s 13th Five Year Plan and the
EU’s 2020 Strategy. To make that happen, both sides ought to adjust their overall
climate posture and undertake specific actions on a set of issues.
First, the EU and China could try to approximate their overall position on climate
governance. For the EU, it would be worth adopting a negotiating strategy that
allows for the formulation of distinctive positions by the UNFCCC parties, thus
drawing the lessons of the Copenhagen summit of 2009 where the Union pushed for
a single set of binding targets applicable for the whole membership but ended up
sidelined. To avoid this, the EU may continue to further the experiences of COP21,
where it acted as a guide negotiating a deal in a bottom-up (based on individually set
reduction targets) rather than top-down fashion (applying a universal reduction
target to all members). The viability of the UNFCCC process may be increasingly
contingent on the building of a mutual understanding among the largest emitters in
the run-up to climate summits, which could serve as a benchmark for other parties.
In addition, since the G77 plus China group had split into several camps and held
differing positions at COP21, opinions of all stakeholders including the Umbrella
Group9 and the BASICs10 should be taken into account in order to ensure fairness and
justice to all actors. Moreover, the UNFCCC process could be better linked to other
multilateral platforms, notably the G2011 and the World Trade Organisation (WTO),
which could help settle some key issues. It is worth noting that the EU has already
made significant strides to embrace an evidence-informed rather than evidence-
based attitude to policy-making which gives more consideration to balancing
differing climate governance goals.12
8 Z. Shuang, ‘China’s carbon market – progress and outlook‘, National Climate Change Strategy Centre, last
accessed on 22 March 2017.
9 Although there is no formal list, the Group is usually made up of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand,
Kazakhstan, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the US.
10 The group comprises Brazil, South Africa, India and China.
11 news.xinhuanet.com, ‘China Focus: China pushes green finance onto G20 agenda‘, 2 September 2016, last
accessed on 17 March 2017.
12 D.C. Rose, ‘Five ways to enhance the impact of climate science’, Nature Climate Change, 4(7), 2014, pp.
522-524.20
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also assuming more responsibilities. Beijing’s revamped climate action could start
with domestic economic reform on energy consumption and renewable energy
development – steps that could allow the country to reduce the energy intensity of
its economy. For example, China has launched the 2017 carbon market plan and
formulated province-specific emission reduction ambitions which are both revolu-
tionary actions in Chinese policy-making. Additionally, China should match its
internal aspirations when acting on the global stage and adopt a more powerful
discourse.
Second, the two parties need to invest more efforts into understanding each other’s
core narratives and establish cooperation based on fundamental mutual trust. As far
as the most contentious issue – the CBDR principle – is concerned, several delegates
at the Lima Conference in 2014 agreed that “differentiation was the elephant in the
room”.13 The EU needs to gain a deeper understanding of China’s and other devel-
oping countries’ concerns about ambitious reduction targets while also supporting
developing countries through the provision of climate finance, technology and
capacity building. As for China, the country needs to strengthen its emission reduc-
tion commitments and make its policies more transparent.
Finally, the EU and China could take advantage of a broad variety of platforms to
enhance cooperation in technology, finance along with their policy-making dialogue.
The EU-China summit has been a significant platform for strategic planning on
climate change since the 5th summit in 2002. At the 8th summit in 2005, the two
parties formulated a joint declaration on climate change and have since continued to
work towards their joint objectives. The regular ministerial dialogues and consulta-
tion mechanisms that take place between EU and Chinese officials also provide an
important channel for the two sides to exchange views. Some key achievements
include, for example, the joint declaration of the two parties in Brussels in December
2015 that proved to be an important step towards the eventual climate deal in
Paris.14 Another concrete initiative, the Clean Development Mechanism subsidized
by the European Commission, is committed to supporting CDM projects, staff
training and technology development in China, which has already culminated in
remarkable results.15 The EU and China should also further exploit the development
opportunity residing in clean energy usage, carbon trading system building and green
finance regulation.
In the future, Brussels and Beijing will need to optimize the above two channels even
further to unlock the full potential of EU-China cooperation. Furthermore, co-opera-
13 A. Meyer, Confronting the Elephant in the Room: Differentiation of Obligations in the Paris Climate Agree-
ment, UCSUSA Blog, 19 December 2014.
14 eeas.europa.eu, EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change, 29 June 2015, last accessed on 17 March
2017.
15 For more information on the Clean Development Mechanism in China see: http://cdm-en.ccchina.gov.cn/21
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEtion on climate change could go beyond EU-China relations, embracing also EU
member states’ bilateral relations with China as well as the relations existing
between the two at the level of regional authorities.
Finally, the two can also learn from each other’s central planning structures on green
governance – the EU from China’s unique central planning politics and increasingly
liberalized economy; and China from the EU’s systematic management of its member
states.16
Conclusion
The EU and China have enduring disagreements on how to mitigate climate change.
However, their differences are not impossible to overcome. Climate politics is
arguably a unique field suitable for establishing mechanisms of cooperation between
the EU and China. This is because both have deeply entrenched interests to shape
policy-making on climate change and push forward the international negotiation
processes. Having entered into force recently, the Paris agreement aims to ensure
that global temperature rise by the end of this century remain well below 2 degrees
Celsius above pre-industrial levels, pursuing additional efforts to limit the tempera-
ture increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Against this background, the EU
and China ought to join forces to resolve their differences and strengthen the INDC
system. What needs to be done first is the implementation of INDCs followed by their
effective tracking on the domestic front. At the same time, the EU and China could
continue to iron out their lingering differences through the provision of green
finance, with the long term goal of establishing a global carbon trading system.
Bai Hefei, Research Assistant at the Center for Economic Diplomacy, University of
International Business and Economics.
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16 S. Kalantzakos, ‘EU and China: Leadership after COP21’, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign
Policy, Working paper no.72/2016.22
EU-CHINA COLLABORATION ON INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY ISSUES
FENG ZHEN
The global economic crisis, erupting in the United States in 2008, has raised doubts
about the efficiency of the current dollar-led international monetary system. Several
years later, the United States overcame the crisis by implementing a policy of quanti-
tative easing, low interest rates and relying on the leading position of the US dollar
in the global financial markets. As a result, the US dollar has kept its competitiveness
and prevalence in the world economy. In contrast to Washington’s prompt crisis
recovery, the European Union (EU) is still sinking in the morass of the debt crisis while
China has seen its economic growth rate gradually slow down. Despite domestic diffi-
culties, China and the EU continue to have significant opportunities to co-operate in
international politics and economics in leading the world towards a just global
governance system and promoting inclusive development. In fact, their co-operation
in the international system is perhaps more important than ever in light of new US
President Donald Trump’s expected isolationist approach to international relations
and general septicity towards multilateral institutions. This contribution argues that
one of the essential topics in EU-China collaboration will concern the reform of the
international monetary system and assesses the EU’s and China’s stance on the
reform.
Challenging the primacy of the US dollar?
In retrospect, Europe is where some of the greatest progress in human civilization
has been achieved. In the past two centuries, the continent has shifted its focus from
being a colonising power that plunders other territories around the world to an
entity that is led by the purpose of creating a modern civilization. Especially in the
wake of World War II, Europe came to be associated with the image of a fast growing
economy and mature society, rising from the ruins to become one of the most devel-
oped areas in the world – aided by the United States through the provision of
economic recovery schemes (e.g. Marshall Plan) and the security umbrella of NATO.
Given their shared values, the EU and the United States have continued to have close
opinions on a variety of international issues, facilitating their cooperation on politics,
economics, trade, finance and the reform of the monetary system. The two actors
are, however, not always on the same page. Since the inception of the Euro as a joint
currency for the 28-country bloc, cracks have gradually surfaced between the EU and
its transatlantic partner on monetary issues. While a multiple international currency23
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system, this would represent a challenge to the dollar-led financial system and thus
challenge Washington’s interests. Although driven by differing interests, working
towards a more diverse currency system is an area of potential co-operation for the
EU and China.
The EU as a monetary power
To begin with, in order to render the Euro a strong currency able to stimulate growth
across the EU, it is crucial that the Union stabilise the Euro area and strengthen the
monetary and public financial management of the currency. In this case, the current
slowdown in the deepening and enlargement of European integration may give
ample time and space to solve the core problems such as the lack of adequate
linkages between monetary and fiscal policies in both internal and external channels.
There is also significant room for improvement in the single-currency bloc’s external
representation. In the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, Eurozone
members own significant quota shares and voting power and have also several
representatives on the executive board of the body. While EU member states often
have to face the argument of overrepresentation, the fact remains that their voting
power falls short of what would be justified on the basis of their quota contributions.
Yet, a single European voice on any reform initiative is complicated by the fact that
the Eurozone does not have a unified representation on the executive board of the
Washington-based institution.1
China’s opening and the internationalisation of the renminbi
Despite persisting signs of resistance in certain areas, China appears to be furthering
its process of opening up and continues to achieve considerable economic growth.
For external observers, it remains however difficult to ascertain where the balance
between efficiency and equality considerations lies regarding the pace and direction
of reforms. The internationalization of the renminbi is one of the main engines
allowing China to continue its economic liberalisation and policy of opening up.
Firstly, it can facilitate the opening of China’s financial market, including through a
market based interest rate in the domestic market and a floating exchange rate in
international market. Secondly, it can also give an additional boost to foreign direct
investment arriving in the country. Thirdly, a more internationalised renminbi may
1 In financial institutions created more recently such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB),
Europeans have been more successful in paving the way for their unified representation. All European
states thus far acceded to the Beijing-based institution form part of two constituencies, one of which
comprises only Eurozone countries. This arrangement allows members of the single-currency bloc to be
represented by one single director on the 12-strong board of directors of the body.24
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erating physical infrastructure development and strengthening China’s standing in
international affairs.
Making rules for international monetary and financial co-operation is not China’s
primary concern at this stage. Instead, in an attempt to move beyond a predominant
focus on domestic governance, the country first seeks to better integrate and have a
greater voice in the international system through the reform orthodox international
financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) and the creation of new ones with the long-
term goal of shaping the rules of the game. Beijing has recently played a major role
in driving the BRICS format (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) towards
increased institutionalisation. The five-country bloc recently launched two new insti-
tutions. The Shanghai-based New Development Bank (NDB) focuses on the provision
of funding for physical infrastructure projects which also serve sustainable develop-
ment considerations. Importantly, the bank so far has only approved lending in local
currencies, including the renminbi, thus contributing to efforts of challenging the
primacy of hard currencies (e.g. US dollar, Euro, Yen) in international development
finance. These five countries have also established the US$ 100 million worth Contin-
gent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) to provide an alternative to the IMF when it comes
to short-term liquidity issues.2 As a unilateral initiative, China also launched the Asian
Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015. The bank, which has been joined
by 57 members with the candidacy of further 13 members approved by its board of
governors on 23 March 2017, also concentrates on the financing of physical infra-
structure development across Asia. The AIIB represents China’s first attempt of
creating a truly multilateral institution and is part of the country’s strategy of gradu-
ally moving from the predominantly observer position in global governance to exert
substantial influence on multilateral issues.3 In short, China is still in the process of
gaining greater foothold in the multilateral system, which is hoped to allow the
country in the long term to better reflect its interests in the decisions taken therein.
EU-China co-operation for a strengthened monetary and financial 
system
Against the background of the financial and economic crisis, pushing for reform of
the international monetary system is one of the key issues for cooperation between
China and the EU. Perceived widely, this would include, but not limited to, coopera-
tion on currencies, financial regulation and financial infrastructure construction, to
2 China is the largest contributor to the arrangement, making available 41% of the total capital.
3 The AIIB has signed a memorandum of understanding with several established multilateral development
banks, including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the European Investment Bank (EIB). In
the framework of its co-operation with this latter, AIIB officials closely observe project appraisal processes
by EIB staff, which demonstrates the learning opportunities the Beijing-based institution represents for
China.25
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internationalization of the Chinese currency via renminbi clearing, currency swap
plans and off-shore market construction. Not only does this increase cooperation
opportunities between China and the EU, but it can also strengthen local companies’
role in international business. The creation and growth of international currencies
like the Euro and Renminbi is conducive to establishing a new stable multi-currency
reserve system.
The reform of the IMF is another area for EU-China cooperation. In the long run,
further quota shares could be transferred from developed to developing countries.
By way of compensating for quota transfers and the resulting loss of voting power,
the unified representation of the Union or the Euro zone in the body could be facili-
tated. In this respect, China should co-operate closely with the EU to push the reform
of basic laws of representative rights in the body.
In addition, Both China and the EU have emphasised the necessity of financial
stability in the wake of the financial crisis. In this regard, there are two principal ways
in which the two could co-operate. On the one hand, China could support the EU’s
efforts to enhance the regulation of the international financial market. For example,
the implementation of the Basel Accords provides a series of measures to improve
stability in the financial markets of both developed economies like the United States
and those of the EU, but also emerging economies like China. On the other hand, as
a developing country, China should learn more from the European experience of
financial market development and regulation. Finance and banking is a traditional
sector that values more stability than innovation. China must be very cautious about
the fast growth of internet financing and shadow banking, especially in an environ-
ment lacking regulations.
Financial infrastructure is the base for a healthy financial market as it facilitates
market exchange and controls the wave of price fluctuations. The Society for World-
wide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is one of the small number of
intermediary financial institutions not controlled by the United States. The China
Interbank Payment System (CIPS) is a new worldwide renminbi clearing system
operated by the People’s Bank of China (the Central Bank of China). These two insti-
tutions may co-operate more closely to support a secure, standardized and reliable
financial transaction of the renminbi. China and the EU also have the potential to
strengthen their collaboration on financial rating services to support both investors
and issuers outside the United States to keep a relatively stable and reasonable price
waving and control systematic risks.
As mentioned above, China is also organising new platforms to support inclusive
development and strengthen regional and international cooperation, including
through the AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative – a development framework first
introduced by the Chinese government in 2013 with the aim of increasing economic26
EU-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEcooperation and connectivity in Eurasia. These initiatives are open to all countries,
including EU member states, to support long-term basic infrastructure construction
and industrial development in the Asian and African regions. Most of the projects or
constructions may be located in developing areas, but the EU and its member states
will be an important partner for co-operation for China. Firstly, this is because infra-
structure investment needs in Asia are so vast that no single country could account
for it. Furthermore, effective cooperation between China and the EU could also
reduce the risk of politics getting in the way of investment in the region, ensuring also
a long-term stable benefit-share mechanism.
Secondly, China lacks experience in international institutions and projects both from
a governance or market point of view. The participation of EU countries in these
schemes could help strengthen the internal management and bring experience in
terms of market operations. The challenge lies is ensuring a win-win co-operation for
all sides, including China, the EU and the project beneficiary. This may necessitate
that co-operation transcend barriers of politics, religions and culture with a view to
finding an innovative way of collaboration.
In sum, China and the EU have a significant potential to jointly better the interna-
tional monetary and financial system. Both sides have their advantages in different
industrial and service sectors and they complement each other. The cooperation will
also undoubtedly improve the growth prospects of the world economy and set the
stage towards a next wave of growth.
Feng Zhen is an Associate Professor of economics at the School of Statistics,
Renmin University of China, and an affiliated researcher at UNU-MERIT. He holds a
PhD in economics from Renmin University of China.27
CONCLUSION
BALAZS UJVARI
At a time when the United States is giving signs of losing faith in multilateral co-
operation and Chinese President Xi Jinping defends openness and globalisation (as
was the case at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017), the prospects
for overcoming China’s and the EU’s conceptual differences on global governance
appears to stand a greater chance than ever. With a view to generating some
pointers as to how this could be done most effectively, this Egmont Paper has drawn
on the contribution of four Chinese experts on EU-China relations. The conclusion
that has emerged is threefold.
First, it seems now clear that hopes that China would be gradually socialised into the
European way of multilateral policy-making through extant international institutions
(e.g. IMF, World Bank) are doomed to failure. In addition to seeking to instil novel
dynamics into the way orthodox institutions function, the foremost strand of
Beijing’s strategy now concerns an assertion of international leadership through the
creation of new institutions which are more tailored to China’s own approach to
international governance. This does not necessarily mean that, in an effort to accel-
erate the delivery of development aid for example, new institutions such as the AIIB
or the NDB will place lesser emphasis on governance, social or environmental stand-
ards than their orthodox counterparts. Rather, it appears that efficiency gains will
stem from innovative solutions such as the non-resident board of directors and a
greater use of telecommunication tools, among others. As a result, a successful co-
operation in the future between the EU and China will be not only contingent upon
the extent to which the latter accepts the ‘European way’, but the question will also
arise as to whether Europeans are prepared to embrace the governance dynamics
permeating the new set of institutions centred upon China. With 16 EU member
states having joined the AIIB,1 it can be claimed that Europeans have observed these
latest dynamics with an open mind. As the Trump-led US administration is likely to
veto any reform initiatives resulting in further quota transfers towards emerging
powers (especially China) in established international organisations, one may see the
launch of further multilateral structures by Beijing and its BRICS partners. This will
make it imperative for the EU to assess these dynamics from a strategic angle to
determine how the 28-country is ought to respond to a gradually expanding multilat-
eral system mainly reflective of China’s own considerations.
1 The membership request of Belgium and Hungary was approved by the AIIB’s board of directors on 23
March 2017.28
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affairs will not only have to occur in formal international institutions but also in the
context of multilateral treaties, especially in the field of climate change. To ensure
that the UNFCCC process remains viable post-COP21, it may be necessary for the EU
to permanently settle for a bottom-up method where emission reduction targets are
determined voluntarily. As this approach contrasts with the EU’s general preference
for a single set of universally applicable objectives in multilateral negotiations, China
will need to compensate by formulating robust commitments and achieving a higher
degree of transparency at the domestic level to render its climate action more trace-
able for international observers. The dynamic, where the EU gives greater room for
voluntary action (thus also showing greater respect for sovereignty) and none- or
partially binding arrangements in exchange for robust policy action and transparency
gains from China, may also have the potential to mark the way forward in other areas
of international co-operation too. To ensure that China abides by its non-binding
commitments, the EU could use a plethora of multilateral (e.g. G20, WTO) fora and
bilateral policy dialogues (EU-China summit) to provide further – financial – incen-
tives to the country (e.g. climate financing) in return for Beijing’s support for the
Union’s stance in global regulatory processes (e.g. green goods, information
technology, green finance).
Third, policy-making is increasingly shifting, in several areas, from multilateral arenas
to bi- and plurilateral platforms. This is notably the case in the field of trade where,
in a post-TTIP era, the prospect of an EU-China FTA is likely to represent the largest
rewards for the world economy. Despite China signalling an interest in embracing
EU-style environmental, procurement and labour standards in its trade accords,
doing so would still largely be inconsistent with domestic economic interests (think
of working hour considerations or the energy intensity of Chinese industry) in the
short term. This also raises the general issue that plagues EU-China co-operation
across global governance: how to reconcile China’s insistence on unhindered
economic development with the EU’s insistence on legal standards without the latter
adversely affecting the former. In the specific case of commercial relations, one way
to proceed my lie in enhancing the two sides’ understanding of how each other’s
approaches to trade regulations would impact their respective systems not only from
an economic but also from a social perspective. Hence the importance of providing
for educational and training opportunities for Chinese and European trade officials
about each other’s commercial systems, while also creating exchange opportunities
for aspiring civil servants of the two sides at an early stage of their education.
Balazs Ujvari is a Joint Research Fellow at the Egmont – Royal Institute for Interna-
tional Relations and the European Policy Centre.29
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